What is the correct structure of HUMAN Intelligence?

The U.S. cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. We must pursue the hard right over the easy wrong and develop new formations that are capable of fighting a counterinsurgency along side of a high intensity conflict. The combined arms fight will continue into the future and the military soldiers of old and the politicians must find a common ground to operate in a conventional and unconventional conflict.

Intelligence is one of GEN Petreaus's critical areas in creating a stable environment for Iraq. Over the course of the last 6 years, I have witnessed the stove pipe of intelligence (HUMINT and CI) both with good reason. The foremost is the protection of our Soldier's and the Sources that provide the information. However, with the increase in demand for timely information gathering, the Intelligence and Security Command is struggling to keep pace with the COE. These problems have been identified in manpower, training, and systems capabilities, but the larger problem still remains with proper handling of intelligence.

The intelligence that I speak of is the raw information that is obtained on the battlefield. In Iraq, we do not have enough HUMINT Collection Teams to provide every commander their own asset. Instead we over task Soldiers with little experience and attempt to control Sources at the Battalion Cmd level. This environment is not productive for the HCTs and the Brigade S2X, who must manage and task these assets to answer the BDE and DIV PIR. One method that can piggy back off of training that I developed in the 25th ID, is the formation of company tactical site exploitation teams. These teams were trained in biometrics, tactical questioning, fingerprinting, evidence collection, detainee operations, and limited language training. Other units integrated the use of trained Soldiers for intelligence analysis at the company level.

The implementation of these teams has become the SOP for most units deploying to OIF and OEF. However, we are still falling behind in HUMINT Collection. Over the course of a units training cycle, commander's can identify 4 Soldiers per company to attend a two week course that will give them the skills to conduct basic HUMINT operations. The tools necessary to accomplish this already exist at FT Huachuca, it is merely a matter of developing new operational guidelines by the Defense Intelligence Agency to assist the collectors and the managers of Source operations. Reporting procedures would allow the Battalion to receive concise reports from organic HCTs and have the SME available to continue operations beyond the skill set of the basic collector. In addition, reports could now be sent to the Brigade S2X for approval and proper vetting to determine the accuracy of the reports.

In summary, the Army must change to meet the demands of the COE and in doing so we must train non-intelligence personnel on collection and reporting methods to reduce the risk to our Soldiers, Sources, and also circular reporting.